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The explosion of Credit derivatives and top-rated corporate securities issuance is a Monetary Development of historic proportions. I have written about the "Moneyness of Credit" issue over the past few years, but never did I imagine it would come to this. Marketplace perceptions of safety and liquidity are today being grossly distorted on a scale – multi-trillions of securities from one corner of the world to another - that so overshadow the technology Bubble – that overshadow anything previously experienced in the history of finance.

Following in the footsteps of the technology derivatives Bubble, the mania in Credit "insurance" ensures a collapse. It today feeds a self-reinforcing boom, but when this cycle inevitably reverses, the scope of Credit losses will quickly overwhelm the thinly capitalized speculators that have been more than happy to book premiums directly to profits. Undoubtedly, an unfolding bust will find this "insurance" market in complete disarray. Much of the marketplace today expects that they will - when things begin to turn sour - either obtain Credit "insurance" or hedge/"reinsure" protection already written. But when much of the marketplace moves to offload Credit risk there will simply be no one to take the other side of the trade. As losses mount, the market will then face the harsh reality that minimal "insurance" reserves are actually available to make good on all the protection written. This will have a profoundly negative impact on both Credit Availability and marketplace liquidity – ruining the plans of many expecting – and requiring – that "money" always flow so freely.

A major problem with the current monetary boom – the "Moneyness of Credit Bubble" – is the enormous and widening gulf between the market's perception of safety and liquidity and the acute vulnerability of the actual underlying Credits. Runaway booms invariably destroy the "money" – in whatever form it takes – whose inflationary expansion was responsible for fueling the Bubble. This lesson should have been learned from the late-twenties experience, or various other fiascos as far back as John Law. When current perceptions change – when $ trillions of Credit instruments are reclassified and revalued as risky instruments as opposed to today’s coveted "money" – Dr. Bernanke will learn why a central bank’s monetary focus must be in restraining "money" and Credit excesses during the boom. And the longer this destabilizing period of transforming risky Credits into perceived "money" is allowed to run unchecked, the more impotent his little "mop-up" operations will appear in the face of widespread financial and economic dislocation – on a global scale.

Doug Noland is a market strategist at Prudent Bear Funds. Their website is www.prudentbear.com.