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TED
BUTLER'S ARCHIVES
TED BUTLER
COMMENTARY
October 23, 2007
MONEY FOR NOTHING
(This essay was written by silver analyst Theodore
Butler, an independent consultant. Investment Rarities does not
necessarily endorse these views, which may or may not prove to be
correct.)
On September 24, a Federal Judge in New York heard
final oral arguments in the class-action settlement between Morgan
Stanley and 22,000 of their clients involving costs associated with the
storage of precious metals. The parties have agreed to settlement terms.
Morgan Stanley will pay several million dollars and promises to revise
their precious metals storage processes. However, there is no admission
of any wrongdoing. Unfortunately, the class-action participants will
receive very little and it will be, basically, business as usual as far
as Morgan Stanley’s precious metals storage practices are concerned. All
that’s left is for a final approval by the judge.
The issue specifically concerns whether Morgan
Stanley and many other large financial organizations who claim to hold
and store silver for their customers, actually possess the silver. This
case came into existence as a direct result of a number of articles I
wrote several years ago. I admit to a high level of satisfaction that
the case confirmed a major contention of mine, in spite of doubts by
many when I first wrote about it. (When I wrote the original articles, I
did not use the name Morgan Stanley, and had no idea a legal case would
be brought that involved them).
I have long maintained and written that there are two
types of silver when it comes to professional storage, real silver and
paper silver; cold hard metal versus imaginary or make-believe silver. I
claimed that investors could be making a mistake in assuming that the
metal held for them actually existed. I warned that free storage was a
certain tip-off that no real metal existed, but even the payment of
storage charges did not prove that real metal existed.
I offered a simple solution for any investor with
stored silver to determine if the real metal existed or not. Most stored
silver is in 1000-ounce bars, and they are always identified with serial
numbers and a specific weight. If an investor was concerned, all he or
she had to do was request the serial numbers and specific weights of the
bars they owned.
A reader, who held silver in 1000 oz bars, requested
Morgan Stanley provide him with the serial numbers and weights of his
bars, on which he had paid storage and insurance fees for many years. He
was given the run-around and not the serial numbers and weights. I am
aware of this through e-mail exchanges with him. I told him that the
only plausible reason they wouldn’t give him the information was because
the bars did not exist. He contacted a lawyer and that ultimately
resulted in the class-action settlement, after years of legal wrangling.
This, obviously, is a concern for those who buy
quantities of silver that they can’t reasonably store at home, or in a
safe-deposit box, and must use a storage program. A $100,000 worth of
gold weighs 10 pounds and platinum weighs around 5 lbs. These are
weights easily handled personally by most people. With silver, $100,000
worth weighs around 500 pounds, a weight not easily handled.
Safe storage is more of an issue unique to silver
than any other precious metal. While Morgan Stanley issued statements
that it was storing all types of precious metals, the largest single
amount was silver. It was a client’s inquiry about his 1000 oz bars that
precipitated the class-action suit. Logic would dictate that this is
also the case with hundreds of other worldwide financial institutions
that claim to store precious metals for their clients.
I found it appalling that Morgan Stanley would claim
to store silver that didn’t exist and even have the chutzpah to charge
for the storage. That would appear to be a clear case of fraud. I am
even more appalled that the judge in the case, or any government
regulator, would look the other way. The important lesson here is not
that Morgan Stanley got caught with its hand in the cookie jar, but what
silver investors can learn from this episode.
If you have an investment in 1000 oz silver bars
which are stored for you and you don’t have serial numbers and specific
weights, you don’t own real silver. If you have a pool account you don’t
own real silver. It you have any account where you don’t have the clear
ability to demand delivery at anytime with no additional fabrication
charges, you don’t own real silver. Period. If the dealer you bought the
silver from stores it for you, and it is not an independent storage
facility that is holding it in your name, you are taking great risks.
If you have paid full value for your stored silver,
including storage and insurance fees, and don’t have the serial numbers
and weights on your 1000-ounce bars, you must rectify that circumstance
immediately. By not actually buying and storing the real metal to back
the customers’ purchase, financial firms can greatly enhance their
bottom line profits through the free use of the customers’ funds. Morgan
Stanley’s actions were not in any way unique in this practice. In fact,
in the court documents summarizing the proposed settlement, one of
Morgan Stanley’s defenses was that they were not doing anything unusual
by charging storage on metal that didn’t exist, as this is a widespread
industry practice.
On a purely financial basis, the institution is given
cash by the client and does not have to return it until the client sells
his silver, which may not be for years or decades. For the entire time
the client does not sell, the firm has full use of his money on a zero
cost of funds basis. Those firms who charged, and still charge, storage
and insurance fees for the non-existent silver rake in even more from
the client. Honest dealings aside, this is a very cash-flow positive
business for these institutions. Even if silver doubles or triples in
price, there is no margin call to the selling institution, as clients
don’t issue margin calls. As long as clients don’t sell on a net basis,
the issuing institution still doesn’t experience negative cash flow. In
our short-term world, that is all that matters. If you or I arranged to
do what hundreds of world financial institutions have done, we would
quickly be put in jail, as it is fraud, pure and simple.
Due to its bulk, silver is often stored in large
quantities and dollar amounts. Because the unbacked silver storage
accounts have been in existence for decades, the amount of non-existent
silver is very large. I would conservatively estimate that at least a
billion ounces of this silver is on the books (although I feel the true
amount is much larger).
I prefer to deal in documented facts and figures, and
not to guess what the total amount might be, but there are no reporting
requirements or clearinghouse data available. Were it not for the
class-action settlement involving Morgan Stanley, I’m sure many would
deny this situation existed at all. Fortunately, because of this case,
no one can deny the practice of unbacked silver certificates exists.
Had the actual silver been purchased, as it should
have been, when the clients deposited funds to pay for the metal, that
would have been reflected in the price. In addition to deceiving the
client, they short-circuited the normal supply and demand function of
the free market. This was an unfair restraint of trade and the free
market. To those who would say this is no big deal, ask yourself this –
would you knowingly do business with a stock or bond broker who never
actually bought what you instructed them to buy, but just treated your
investment as a bookie and bet you were wrong? Would securities and
banking regulators look the other way?
This is a short position, pure and simple. The firms
and banks that have sold silver to clients without immediately going out
and buying the real silver that the clients paid for are short the
metal. That means the issuers are liable and responsible for any price
rise in silver over the price to the client. For small and medium sized
firms, this is a huge risk.
This is a short position separate and distinct from
the short positions on the COMEX or from forward selling/leasing. This
puts the combined short position for silver in the billions of ounces.
To suggest this unbacked short position is somehow hedged (just as some
contend, the forward selling/leasing position is somehow hedged) is
nonsense. The documented commercial long position on the COMEX is so
small that it couldn’t cover even one medium-sized issuer of unbacked
silver certificates.
It is important to remember that this incredibly
large, additional short position unique to silver has the same price
effects that all large short positions have in any item. First, comes
the artificial price-depressing impact it has when it is created, then
comes the artificial price-enhancing effect when it is eventually closed
out. What that means to investors is this – the price-depressing phase
of short sales of unbacked silver storage programs is behind us. This is
one more reason why silver is still so cheap. That’s good news because
what could be better than buying a high-quality asset at a big discount
to its real value?
Furthermore, the price-enhancing impact is still to
come. The banks and firms that issued these unbacked silver certificates
haven’t panicked and rushed to buy back silver to limit their liability
and exposure. So far, their individual losses are manageable, and I’m
sure they still believe silver will go down in price in the future and
the problem will go away. While it’s true that these large institutions
have a higher tolerance for financial pain than most, it’s also true
when they do panic, they panic big. I believe they will panic at $30 or
$50 or higher.
I am sure that eventually we will read about the
great losses some institutions have suffered from very high silver
prices because they sold silver to clients that they never actually
purchased. People will scratch their heads and ask how those firms could
do something so foolish, just like many today question how big firms
could offer mortgages to borrowers of poor quality. The few who are
aware of these facts in advance are afforded the opportunity to take
advantage of the coming silver price explosion. This storage fiasco is
another one of many factors we have pointed out about silver that has
proven to be correct. We are just as certain that the price of silver
must multiply many times over. Don’t let this once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity pass you by.
(Editors note: This is another case where Ted Butler
hit the ball out of the park. He’s the only person to ever write about
phony storage. As a result, he was dismissed as a crank by numerous
stockbrokers employed by the big firms. People have doubted most of his
primary arguments about silver, but he has been right. When he talks
about manipulation and short selling, there is every reason to believe
it’s true. If his price predictions prove to be accurate, silver will be
a fortune builder.) |