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TED
BUTLER'S ARCHIVES
TED BUTLER COMMENTARY
September 11, 2007
Stir It Up
(This essay was written by silver analyst Theodore Butler, an
independent consultant. Investment Rarities does not necessarily endorse
these views, which may or may not prove to be correct.)
A few comments before I print a discussion I had with my friend
Israel Friedman some weeks back. Once again, the bullish COT set up was
accurate in predicting the impressive recent $70 gold rally. Less
impressive has been the rally in silver, which appears to being dragged
upward by gold. If one were to analyze strictly on short-term price
behavior, the price action in silver could not be considered
constructive. Then again, short-term price behavior is not the way to
properly analyze a market.
While gold has performed admirably price-wise, the COTs suggest it
may now be time for caution. The gold COTs, for the week ended September
4, deteriorated by more than 25,000 contracts net, due to tech fund
buying and dealer selling. More importantly, extrapolation from the
cut-off date indicates significant further gold COT deterioration,
perhaps by 30 to 40,000 contracts or more. The sharp rally in gold took
us from a very bullish COT market structure to a bearish structure. Tops
are much more difficult to call than bottoms, and we still may have a
ways to go in price, but from a COT perspective, there are caution flags
flying in gold.
In addition, there has been impressive buying in the GLD gold ETF, to
the tune of around 1.5 million ounces. On top of that, the Australian
gold miner Newcrest announced it had pre-purchased 2.3 million ounces of
gold in the last week, to close out its gold hedge book.
All told, from just the COMEX, the GLD and Newcrest (allowing for
overlap), some 10 million gold ounces or more were purchased recently
(paper and metal), with a total value of near $7 billion. That’s a lot
of money and a lot of gold. In some ways, considering these amounts, the
price rally in gold is somewhat subdued. (I shudder when I think of the
potential price impact on silver if a fraction of that money found its
way to silver). Of course, this same amount of gold was sold, with most
of those sales being of the short-sale variety.
It would be unobjective to not consider the flip side to the sudden
bullishness in gold. For one, the 10 million ounces purchased has
already been purchased, meaning the price impact is spent and past. It
will take new buying to propel prices upward. Of course, new buying may
come in droves. Then again, we can’t be sure of that. Two, a mining
company who sold short at close to the bottom and has remained short for
years, only to buy near $700, is not my idea of a poster child for
accurate market timing, but perhaps as a contrarian indicator. Nor have
technical and momentum traders had good records at predicting gold and
silver prices.
Finally, it always bothers me that those selling and shorting into
all this buying, the dealers, always seem to end up on the right side of
the trade eventually. I’d love to see them get run over, but how often
has that occurred? Bottom-line, we may go a lot higher in gold, but we
are nowhere near the great COT set up of just a few weeks ago. That
means risk has grown.
The silver COTs were surprisingly bullish, with further multi-year
bullish extremes registered as the dealers were, once again, net buyers.
While there may have been some slight deterioration in silver since the
cut-off, it was nowhere near the deterioration witnessed in gold. I know
price action indicates gold is stronger than silver, but changes in the
COT market structures suggest that will change at some point.
I can’t remember a time when the COTs were this bullish in silver and
this bearish in gold concurrently. In fact, my principle short-term
concern is what a possible sell-off in gold might do to silver, as there
is nothing in the COTs that are negative to silver. The only reason that
I harbor such thoughts is that is what I come up with when I view this
market through the criminal eye. That is the logical perspective to a
criminally manipulated market.
I’m still convinced that we are still witnessing the final clean out
in silver, where the dealers buy as many contracts as possible, which a
sell-off in gold might enable. Whether there is more to go in this final
silver clean out should be known shortly.
I had a conversation from someone in the CFTC’s media department
today. She called to tell me that they put their letter to silver
investors, dated May 14, 2004, directly on their home page
www.cftc.gov I was told that this was
intended to answer, for the time being, all of you who wrote to the CFTC
about the issue of the concentrated short position in COMEX silver
futures.
I can’t say I’m surprised with this development, as I wrote on August
28,
"I have a sense that the regulators may try to trot out and recycle
the nine-page response from the CFTC back in 2004 to answer the current
questions on concentration. This would, obviously, be non-responsive
since the 2004 letter didn’t address the issue of concentration. I’d
like to prevent such a subterfuge by the regulators."
If the CFTC writes to you directly, citing this old letter as a
response to your concern on the issue of concentration, you should be
deeply offended and should tell them so. You should also know that they
are having a very difficult time answering simple questions with simple
answers. Perhaps you should also involve your Senator or Representative.
One thing should be clear to you, namely, is that the issue of the short
concentration in silver is very important, otherwise, the CFTC and the
COMEX would put it to rest with direct answers.
One quick note about this discussion with Izzy. It was conducted
before my recent revelations about ScotiaMocatta. While Izzy has
different feelings than I do about the silver manipulation (as you will
read), for the first time ever, he took the initiative to write to the
CEO of Scotiabank. I apologize for the length of this piece, but
following the discussion with Izzy, I’ve added another interesting
e-mail from a reader to Scotiabank.
A Discussion With Izzy
My good friend and silver mentor, Izzy Friedman, and I have frequent
and heated discussions on silver. This has been going on, almost daily,
for close to twenty-five years. New readers might not know that I first
became interested in silver because of a challenge from Izzy to
investigate silver. Without that challenge, I probably would not have
dug as deeply into silver.
You may be surprised that Izzy and I could disagree on anything
related to silver. In truth, we do agree on most of the major points,
with some differences. Izzy suggested that we try to recreate the back
and forth that makes up a typical discussion, but he set an interesting
qualifier – no editing of each other’s thoughts. In other words, neither
of us would tone down what we really feel. No holds barred.
Butler: Why don’t you outline where you think we agree, and what our
differences might be, about silver.
Friedman: We agree that silver is a rare metal that has a strategic
importance and at some point we are going to have a shortage. Why don’t
you explain this further?
Butler: Because of the 60-year structural deficit, in which we
consumed more silver each year than the world produced, we depleted the
accumulated inventories of thousands of years of production. As a result
of this inventory depletion, silver has become a rare commodity, more
rare than gold. Because the physical properties of silver are so
superior to other materials in so many different industrial
applications, silver has been transformed from just being a universally
recognized store of value to a strategic and vital industrial commodity.
Due to growing world population and improvements in standards of living,
more demand is being created for silver at precisely the same time of
maximum inventory depletion, and this is straining current production.
Silver is especially unique because it is the only industrial commodity
that the world also considers an investment asset. This dictates a
shortage at some point. Throw in a huge documented short position in
derivatives and bank certificates that lack real silver as backing, and
you have all the ingredients for a price explosion the world will never
forget. The final kicker is that these facts are unknown by all but a
tiny number of silver investors, so the crowd has yet to arrive on the
buying scene.
Friedman: I totally agree with all those points, but let me state
that the rarity of silver is the most important point of all. Anyone
interested in buying and holding silver should keep this point about
rarity above all others. I bought silver in the past and continue to buy
silver only because of its rarity and strategic value.
Butler: What are our differences?
Friedman: First, we disagree about fighting the manipulation. Why are
you fighting the manipulation in silver when for 15 years you don’t have
any results and you do it by yourself? While I think that what you are
doing is noble, I think you are naïve to think that the big shorts could
be forced to cover. In my opinion, only a shortage of silver can break
their backs and force them to cover.
Butler: I agree that a physical shortage will break the shorts’
backs, but I think the shortage can also be triggered by short covering.
In other words, a shortage will surely kill the shorts, but short
covering will cause a shortage, as industrial users and investors buy
silver because of higher prices. It’s just a question of which trips off
the other first. As far as my attempts to end the silver manipulation
not showing results, I think you are dead wrong, although I think this
will only become obvious with the passage of time.
Friedman: Always more time.
Butler: If it weren’t for me having to explain and educate people
about silver in my attempt to end the silver manipulation, far fewer
would have bought silver. Think about it. I’m not a gloom and doomer who
tells everyone to buy silver because it’s protection against the end of
the world. I’m a supply and demand analyst. The only plausible
explanation for why silver didn’t go up for so many years, and why it is
still only a fraction of what it should be, is because of the
manipulation. I don’t explain the manipulation in some wacky government
conspiracy; I document it with public data. How could a reasonable
person buy or hold silver if he didn’t understand and acknowledge the
manipulation? If I thought that the silver market was free and fair, it
wouldn’t offer the incredible opportunity for investment.
Friedman: I’m not arguing with the case you make, only with how it
will be resolved.
Butler: Would you have had the stomach to hold silver for all these
years if you thought its price behavior was based upon the free market?
Friedman: You’ve convinced me that silver is manipulated. I know that
many others have been convinced as well. Your work on the COT is
exceptional. I don’t doubt that the current artificially depressed price
of silver is because of that manipulation. My point was that never in a
thousand years would the authorities ever force the big shorts to cover
because they know it will cause bankruptcies for the shorts. However, I
agree when a shortage comes the authorities will not be able to do
anything to prevent the short covering and the bankruptcies.
Butler: The authorities might not, but the big shorts could always
change their pattern and one of them starts to cover. This is especially
true because of a newfound awareness of risk in the financial world.
Friedman: I think the big shorts will cover, but only at very high
prices. Actually I would like the shorts to sell more, not less, as this
will enable more silver to be bought by investors at cheap prices. I
fully understand you could not buy silver at current prices if it wasn’t
for the shorts.
Butler: What about another difference we have – the future price and
value of silver?
Friedman: You first must understand that I know you are an analyst
who is very careful about what you write. I know that prevents you from
writing things that you really want to say at times. I don’t have such
restrictions. I can say what I believe because everyone knows it’s my
opinion only and I do not get paid to be an analyst.
Butler: We agreed on no holding back.
Friedman: Before I just throw out numbers, let me give you my formula
for how I arrive at my numbers. I start with the price of silver at the
high in 1980, $50/oz. I look at how much silver was in the world then,
both above ground and below ground, still to be mined. Then I compare
how much silver is above and below ground today, and what will be above
and below ground 15 years from now.
Butler: Don’t you think that your starting point, $50 in 1980 is too
high?
Friedman: Some people may say my starting price, the 50 dollar high
in 1980, is too high, but in 1977 I had a different formula that enabled
me to predict and buy silver at $4.50 and sell at $40. Well, actually my
formula then called for $50, but I got nervous and got out at $40,
because so much money was involved and I decided I couldn’t risk waiting
to $50. I think $50 in 1980 is a logical reference point because if one
is trying to measure an ultimate long-term high price in silver, it
should be measured and compared against the previous historical high.
Butler: So what does your formula tell you now?
Friedman: In 1980, we had 2 to 2.5 billion more ounces above ground
than today and since then we have removed more than 12 billion ounces
from the earth. That’s 12 billion ounces less left in the ground today.
We used up the 12 billion mined and another couple of billion ounces
from aboveground inventory. Looking ahead 15 years, we will have less
ounces above ground than we do today and close to 10 billion ounces less
in the ground, due to mining. The price has to be a multiple of the $50
it was at in 1980.
Butler: You’re probably more optimistic on the price than I am.
Friedman: The current fair value for silver should be much higher
than it is currently. That’s what creates the bargain for investors. But
once the shortage hits and the manipulation is broken, and the shorts
have been forced to cover, then I see a much different value attached to
silver. In a true shortage, because we know there is less silver bullion
in the world than gold, I envision that silver has to be, at a minimum,
equal to the price of gold. Common sense tells me that, at some point,
the rarer item has to be worth more than the more plentiful item, no
matter what the current popular thinking may be. This is just a minimum.
That has nothing to do with my formula, just a simple observation that
rarity will always be priced accordingly. That silver is grossly
undervalued compared to gold is good news for silver investors. But this
will only become obvious in a true silver shortage.
Butler: I’m reluctant to make exact price projections.
Friedman: Okay, but if we know that we have so much less silver
today, above and below ground than we had in 1980, it is reasonable to
assume we must climb much higher than the $50 high of 1980, at some
point relatively soon. And if we know that we will also have even less
silver in 15 years, how can we not imagine crazy prices ahead?
Butler: I agree, but arguing for a price higher than gold would be
construed as over-exuberant.
Friedman: The key is not to think about prices, but to think instead
about value and make reasonable assumptions about the future. I’m
assuming world population and economic growth will continue and that
hundreds of millions of new people will join the ranks of the billions
seeking to improve their standards of living. You need natural resources
to accomplish that and none more than silver. Demand for silver must
continue to grow. We have used up all the "easy" and cheap silver, both
above and belowground. The silver that comes to market in the future
will be more difficult to find and more expensive. At some point in the
next 15 years, I think we will see a noticeable decline in mine
production.
Butler: I wrote about that in "Friedman’s Theory" a few years ago.
What about all the above ground silver in jewelry and other objects in
people’s possession around the world? Many say that will flood the
market at higher prices.
Friedman: It will come to market, but I doubt it will be a flood. I’m
counting on this silver coming to meet the surging industrial demand.
But you must remember, price has great influence on how people think.
When prices go up sharply, that increases investment demand,
particularly among wealthy people. The vast majority of affluent people
wouldn’t consider buying silver today because it is too cheap. They look
at something with a cheap price and assume it is cheap for a reason. But
let the price surge and then they will want it. Most rich people
wouldn’t think about a watch or women’s purse for $20, but put a special
brand name and a price tag of $1000 or more, and that’s what they want.
They are used to paying top dollar for everything, so if something isn’t
expensive, they don’t want it. They didn’t want silver at $5, or $10, or
$15, but at more than $100, they will have to own it. They need the
price validation before they buy.
Butler: What about the silver in peoples’ homes?
Friedman: There will be some selling, but maybe not as much as
expected. As the price climbs, people will feel very good about the
silver they own; it will make them feel richer. Because of higher
prices, people will come to appreciate their silver more. It will be a
source of pride and will increase the status of people who own it.
Serving dinner to guests with sterling silverware or bowls will make a
different statement when silver is priced in the hundreds of dollars
than it is today. Polishing expensive silver will seem less a burden
than polishing cheap silver.
I think that as prices climb sharply, more people will become aware
of the true rarity of silver and how there is less of it in existence
every day. People don’t rush to sell what they are convinced is rare and
getting rarer, they look to buy and hold tightly to such things. I can
easily see how silver will be a prime measure of wealth in the future.
Some may sell their silver, but many will not, and many new buyers will
want to buy such silver to improve their social status and sense of
wealth.
Butler: Why don’t you finish your thought on the future value of
silver?
Friedman: The key to future value is at what rate you will be able to
convert an item into other things in the future. In 1980, I was able to
pay for my house, the house I still live in for 2500 ounces of silver I
sold then. If I held until $50, it would have taken only 2000 ounces.
Today, it would take almost 70,000 ounces of silver to buy my house. My
house is nice, but it is not worth 70,000 ounces of silver in my
opinion. Not because my house is too expensive, but because silver is
too cheap. Based upon my own experience with my own house, silver too
cheap by a factor of 30.
I wouldn’t dream of converting silver into anything today. Not for
real estate, stocks or any other commodity, including gold. Today is the
time to convert everything into silver. Then, years into the future, you
will be able to make the same switch that I made in 1980. Only at the
top of the next long cycle you won’t have to spend the 2500 ounces I
spent to buy a good house, you will only need 250 ounces.
Butler: People thought I was crazy to suggest $100 or $200 for silver
a few years ago, but you are suggesting prices in the thousands of
dollars per ounce. Is this with such a depreciated dollar that bread
costs $200 a loaf?
Friedman: No. I’m not predicting what the dollar will buy; it’s not
part of the formula. The formula involves what you can exchange silver
for other things in 1980, today, and what will be in 15 years. I’m not
concerned with factoring in currencies, or money supply or inflation or
any of the things that people spend time discussing. My formula only
considers the relative value of what you will be able to exchange silver
for in the future, based upon the past and the expected changes in
silver over the next 15 years.
Butler: Well, I can’t argue about the past, but what is it,
specifically, that you see about the expected changes in the silver
situation over the next 15 years that leads you to such extreme price
predictions?
Friedman: The fact that we have so much less silver today compared to
1980, and how we will have even less, especially below ground, 15 years
from now. I think silver is being so depleted below ground that in 15
years production will be much less than we see today. You are the one
who first wrote that the US Geological Survey data shows less silver in
the ground than any other mineral, compared to production. Did you
forget? I didn’t forget and I think in 15 years the world will be lucky
to mine 400 million ounces of silver annually, compared to almost 650
million ounces now. Considering what is going on in China and India and
other developing countries, demand has to be higher than now, at least
one billion ounces a year. Where will the silver come from to satisfy
such big demand if production falls, off and at what price? Throw in a
completely different investor psychology brought about by the coming
high price and awareness of silver’s rarity and I think my numbers are
conservative.
Yes, I bought a house for 2500 ounces of silver, but in 15 years it
will take only 250 ounces. Not for me of course, but maybe for my
grandchildren, or anyone who thinks like me.
Butler: I think your formula is fine, because it is based on facts,
but I don’t see thousands of dollars per ounce. I think there will be
enough industrial demand substitution to head off your extreme prices.
Friedman: What price do you foresee 15 years from now?
Butler: It’s possible to get into the hundreds.
Friedman: Under what conditions?
Butler: Conditions should be almost the opposite of what they are
today. No concentrated short position will exist. I look for silver to
be the center of financial attention, instead of an overlooked
stepchild. I would look for signs that the free market was balancing
supply and demand. I know you don’t think that will ever be possible,
but I’m not so sure and plan to keep an open mind. I would get nervous
when everyone is convinced that silver can only go higher, after it has
already gone very high.
Although both of us, obviously, feel very strongly about how
undervalued silver is currently, some day it won’t be undervalued. And
as hard as it is to convince some people today about the great current
under valuation, there will come a time, at much higher prices, when it
will be hard to convince many that silver is no longer undervalued.
While we disagree on how to address the manipulation one thing we do
agree on is the opportunity of a lifetime that real silver offers.
Friedman: On that we definitely agree.
E-MAIL TO SCOTIAMOCATTA
We have slightly condensed the following e-mail sent by a reader.
"Dear Mr. Waugh CEO of Scotia Mocatta
Thank you for replying to Mr. Butler's letter. A reply is more than we
generally get. I would like to point out to you an observation; you
should not take comfort in the fact that the regulatory authorities have
not seen fit to investigate you with regard to your silver market
manipulation. Govt actions dealing with manipulation many times come
after the blow up. It's called the blame game and the Govt never takes
the blame. The authorities have a history of not implementing their
regulatory responsibilities before the fact. They more often react after
there is a melt down so when it is all over they look like they are on
top of things. So where does this place you. In my estimation, it is
very simple. You are the CEO of Scotia and to the extent manipulation
blows up on your watch you have a big problem as a CEO. The simple
solution for you is to do something about it now. You have been warned
of the problem.
As a suggestion get your legal staff to study the way the regulatory
agencies implement the rules and regulations they are empowered to
enforce. I think you will find that many times they do not implement to
regulate but implement to punish. They often react after a problem
becomes an event (subprime: what a joke when it comes to regulatory
oversight). You become an easy target and in the end you are the one
that gets blamed. The Govt makes sure they are the ones that are the
hero to the voters.
In conclusion, if you do not fear the eventual wrath of Govt regulators,
then you are totally unaware of how the game is played.
Also, while you try to cover your shorts, may I suggest you do not
participate in another nuke of the silver market like 08 16 07, as that
was a criminal act of manipulation.
Thank you." |