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TED
BUTLER'S ARCHIVES
TED BUTLER
COMMENTARY
June 24, 2008
A Tiger By The Tail
(This essay was written by silver analyst Theodore Butler, an
independent consultant. Investment Rarities does not necessarily endorse
these views, which may or may not prove to be correct.)
First, a few follow up comments on last week’s article on the short
selling of SLV shares. I knew this would be a controversial issue, and I
was not surprised by the reaction. Many of you forwarded to me the
response you received from Barclays.
Their response was exactly the same as they offered before my article
was published. Barclays said that short sales in SLV are normal and were
contemplated previously. They also said that short sales in SLV shares
do not reduce the amount of silver held in the trust, as short sales are
undertaken by parties outside the trust.
Barclays is in a tough position. While they did do the right thing in
the past, when they followed my suggestion and listed the serial numbers
of the bars held in the trust, that was relatively easy to do. Dealing
with the issue of the shorting of SLV shares is more difficult. That’s
why, in my opinion, they have resorted to legal statements that are
misleading. They aren’t going to say, "thanks for pointing out a serious
problem that we never thought about."
No one, including me, contemplated the issue of short selling in SLV,
or the gold ETFs, (GLD and IAU), when these securities were first
introduced. The shares of GLD have been trading since 2004. The shares
of SLV began trading in April 2006, after an unusual public comment
period by the SEC to determine if the shares should be allowed to trade.
The issue of short selling never came up. My article was the first to
broach the issue.
The simple fact is that all short sales of any common stock, whether
the shares are borrowed first or sold short without borrowing the shares
(naked), necessarily increases the amount of the stock in existence. In
order for any stock short sale to be transacted, someone must buy the
shares. This creates more shares in existence. The buyer has no way of
knowing if the stock he is buying is being sold by someone who owned the
shares (selling out a long position), or if the seller was selling
short.
In a very real sense, the short seller of any stock is issuing new
(phantom) shares of the stock in question. The company whose shares are
being sold short has no responsibility for the effective issuance of the
shares by the short seller. For instance, if a dividend is paid on the
shares, the company is not liable to pay dividends on the shorted
shares, that’s the responsibility of the short seller. In this sense,
Barclays is correct when it says that short sales of SLV are outside the
company’s control and are not a responsibility of Barclays.
But my point is that all the buyers of SLV believe that there are 10
ounces of silver behind every share and Barclays has done nothing to
dissuade anyone of that view. The very reason why the SLV has proven so
popular is precisely because of that belief. Yet, short selling of SLV
shares shatter that belief. Barclays states in their response that short
sales are separate from the trust and the short seller is responsible
for the shorted shares. It’s a clever (and deceptive) way of
acknowledging that there are not 10 ounces of silver behind each share,
as the short sellers are responsible for the silver behind the shorted
shares, not Barclays or the trust. Be realistic, if I were saying
something completely off-base and incorrect, Barclays would demolish my
contentions, not issue non-responsive and vague denials.
Let’s keep this simple. The buyers of SLV pay for their shares and
expect, in turn, that there are 10 ounces of silver behind each share
they own, according to the prospectus. The buyers assume their money is
used to buy silver in the trust. When Barclays issues new shares to the
buyers, that is what occurs. But the short sellers of SLV shares do not
have to deposit 10 ounces of silver for every share they sell short,
like Barclays would if they issued the shares. Therefore, to the extent
there are short sales open in shares of SLV, there is no silver
deposited backing the shares that were shorted, only an obligation of
some type from an unknown short seller.
As I indicated last week, I don’t think any shares of SLV (or GLD or
IAU) should be allowed to be held short, due to the unique nature of
these securities. Because of the rigid metal formula spelled out in the
prospectus, one share sold short is too many, due to the lack of metal
backing on shorted shares. If someone wants to short silver there are
other venues for that shorting, such as the COMEX. It is not necessary
to short SLV shares to be short silver. But we know short selling exists
in these shares.
The questions then become how many SLV shares are sold short and why,
since other shorting venues exist? Is it just the amount published by
the American Stock Exchange (367,000 shares or 3.67 million ounces, as
of 6/10/08) or is it a lot more, say 25 to 50 million ounces as I
contend, due to unreported naked short selling? As I wrote previously, I
arrived at this amount from observing trading action in SLV and noticing
a change in the pattern of volume to metal deposited commencing from
April 15. While that appears to be a large amount of silver to be held
short, in one important way, it is not large at all. Everything is
relative.
If I am correct and there are 25 to 50 million ounces held short, via
SLV shares, that would only represent 10% to 15% of the 325 million
ounces held net short by the 8 largest futures traders on the COMEX.
This 325 million ounces, or 180 days of world mine production, is easily
verified in the current Commitment of Traders Report (COT). In fact, the
current amount held short by the 8 largest traders is 75 million ounces
less than the 400 million ounces they were net short on March 11. In
other words, just that documented change in the big traders’ net short
position is as much as three times larger than what I speculate has been
shorted in the SLV. That suggests that I may not be overstating the
short amount in SLV shares.
That brings us to the question as to why is there any shorting in SLV
shares in the first place, considering established shorting alternatives
already exist? The answer seems clear to me. Such shorting is taking
place because the silver needed to be purchased to accommodate
legitimate new buyers is not available for purchase. At least not at
current prices. Rather than let the price rise to the level needed to
uncover available silver, it is more expedient for certain traders to
just sell the SLV shares naked short. No muss, no fuss, just take the
buyers’ money and worry about it later.
But why would a large trader, most likely an Authorized Participant
(AP), care about paying up to uncover and purchase the available silver
to deposit in the trust as new buyers of SLV emerge? After all, this
would appear to be a simple arbitrage operation, where the AP
simultaneously buys physical and sells shares in SLV. In such an
arbitrage, the price of silver going up wouldn’t matter, as the AP would
only be concerned with the arbitrage difference between what he had to
pay for the physical silver and what he charged the new buyers of SLV
shares. Unless there were more to the story
I believe that the big COMEX shorts are among the AP’s managing the
arbitrage between metal deposited and shares issued in SLV. This is no
great revelation, as these dealers are at the top of the food chain in
all matters silver; physicals, futures, SLV shares. The extremely large
and documented concentrated net short position in COMEX silver futures
provides the clear answer to why there is more to the simple arbitrage
story of buying physical silver at any high price to issue SLV shares.
Certain AP’s doing the arbitrage between buying physical silver for the
SLV and then issuing shares are also among the holders of the documented
concentrated short position on the COMEX. For them to bid up the price
of silver for the SLV would also run the price up on the COMEX, bringing
great losses to their short position there. It is much more convient to
sell SLV shares short and keep the price of silver contained. These big
shorts are protecting their COMEX short position by shorting SLV shares
naked. It’s self-preservation, the most powerful motive in the world.
It’s also illegal as hell.
Further, I think these COMEX traders are now using the SLV to hide
their true short position. After all, the COTs provide verifiable
amounts of contract and concentration data, while naked and unreported
short selling in SLV cannot be documented. Contrary to every modern
financial regulatory intent, that which is transparent may be shifting
to the shadows.
The big deal here is that in alleging manipulation for so many years,
I have always been rebuffed by the CFTC and other regulators that if any
buyer thought that silver was undervalued, then they should just buy it.
Here we have a case where the SLV buyer is putting his money where his
mouth is, but may be tricked into buying an empty promise and not what
he thought he was buying. Shameful.
Let me be clear in my intent. As I spelled out last week, you should
not sell SLV shares because of anything I have written. If you can
switch to other forms of silver, I would do so. Someone capable of
investing in increments of a couple of thousand to ten thousand dollars
would probably be better off buying 100 to 500 Silver Eagles, for
example, than 10 to 50 shares of SLV. Investors of much larger amounts
would be wise to consider allocated storage programs where the silver is
held in your name (with serial numbers), such as COMEX receipts or other
bonded and insured warehouse receipts. Super-large holders of SLV shares
(those who deal in increments of 500.000 ounces) should simply switch
their shares to direct allocated holdings. But if you can’t hold these
other forms of silver, then hold SLV. And buy more. But be sure to give
Barclays a piece of your mind until they root out this short selling, as
I believe is their responsibility. Certainly, they haven’t stepped up to
the plate yet.
Believe it or not, I try to make these articles short and simple. The
problem is that there is much new ground to cover and the issues can be
complex. Please bear with me. Also, like any market, the silver market
has various activities and influences occurring simultaneously on many
different levels. Think of it as a ten or twenty ring circus, much more
complex than the three ring circus of Ringling Bros., where the
high-wire acrobats, the clowns and the elephant parade all performed at
once. Like the circus, there is a common theme to the silver market,
only it’s not simple entertainment.
As I was preparing this article, two new matters developed. The first
was the sudden sharp break in gold and silver prices on Monday. While I
have grown somewhat accustomed to these recurring sharp sell-offs, this
one was somewhat special. I don’t think I witnessed as sharp a drop (75
cents in silver, 25 dollars on gold) in such a short time frame (15
minutes), with so little apparent justification. The real explanation?
We crossed below the same moving averages, we had crossed above a few
days earlier. The dealers allowed enough tech funds and other margined
speculators to buy COMEX futures contracts late last week and then
engineered the price lower by collectively and collusively withholding
bids in the free-fall Monday. The accumulation and subsequent
liquidation of tech fund long/dealer short positions took place in such
a short time span, that it may not even register in next week’s COT, as
it all occurred within the reporting week. The good news is that the
liquidation of the speculative long positions acquired last week appears
complete. Any further liquidation must come from much older acquired
long positions, which remains to be seen.
The second development has to do changes in the gold and silver
holdings in SLV and GLD. In a departure from the pattern of the past six
months, SLV holdings declined 3 million ounces in the past few days to a
still-high 192 million ounces, up more than 45 million ounces from near
the end of December. In gold, the GLD increased its holdings by a very
substantial one million ounces over the past 8 business days, putting
its holdings to about what was held at the end of the year. The real
question is not why GLD increased its holdings, considering the relative
attractiveness of alternative assets, but why has SLV seen any decrease,
albeit minor, at this point?
First, let me rule out the knee-jerk explanation for why SLV holdings
have decreased slightly, namely, that investors sold shares and
liquidated holdings. The trading action, given the normal delays in
metal movement, would have suggested an increase in holdings, given the
rally in silver prices last week. (Monday’s decline couldn’t have been
processed that quickly). That leaves two possible alternative
explanations. Either large investors are taking my advice to switch
shares into direct allocated holdings, or more likely, the silver is
being removed because it is needed industrially or to ship to the COMEX
ahead of the approaching big July delivery.
While generally not thought of in these terms, the large holdings of
the SLV (clearly the largest known silver stockpile in the world)
represent an easy source of readily available silver for industrial and
other purposes. Because the holdings in SLV can be redeemed and removed
on a moment’s notice (granted only through an AP and in increments of
500,000 ounces), it is an ideal source for silver bullion in quantity.
Therefore, this should be kept in mind whenever we see perplexing
reductions in SLV holdings, as it is likely to be more bullish than
bearish. Long-time readers may remember that I had written about this
issue previously.
The point here is that the Silver Managers may be using the holdings
in the SLV as a tool for balancing and micro-managing the flows of
silver around the world. In one sense there is nothing wrong with this,
as property legitimately owned should have no barriers to movement. But
on a much larger perspective, there could be plenty wrong. If the
micro-managing is designed to strengthen and protect a broad silver
price manipulation, then nothing could be more illegal. And that’s
exactly what I think is occurring
My message today concerns what I believe is the most important price
factor in silver. That factor is the concentrated short position, that
is incredibly large and is held in so few hands. Now there is reason to
believe that the manipulation by the concentrated shorts has infected
the SLV, both in the naked shorting of its shares and the use of its
metal holdings to plug gaps in wherever physical silver may be needed,
much like the boy plugging holes in a dike.
The short position explains everything anyone needs to understand
about silver. It explains why silver was priced as it was over the past
two decades, and why it is priced where it is today. The short position
explains why we have labored price rallies and sudden sharp sell offs,
and why silver is so undervalued compared to every other commodity. Most
importantly, the unusual short position explains why silver is the very
best investment today and why its price will rise to the heavens.
The silver short position is unique in almost every way possible. It
is concentrated beyond description, both in terms of as a percent of the
entire market and in terms of days of world production. COMEX silver is
the only market where the commercials have never been net long, only
always net short. Silver is, quite literally, the only market where the
total short position is greater than all the material that exists in the
world. Silver has the only short position which the regulators are
consistently called on to rectify. To their great shame, they never
accommodate the collective will and wisdom of the investing public.
The only question that should be asked is that given the signs and
growing evidence of a developing shortage in silver, why would large
institutional investors place themselves in such potential jeopardy as
to be short such large amounts of silver futures and SLV shares?
Especially in a world growing tight on supplies of just about every
commodity. The answer, I believe, lies in the Oriental tale of the
tiger, or more correctly, of holding a tiger by the tail. The old
Chinese proverb holds that if you are riding on the back of a tiger, or
holding a tiger by the tail, do not dismount or let go, as you will be
eaten.
I think this is exactly the position of the big concentrated silver
shorts. They started out, years ago, in complete control of the silver
market. To many, they appear still to be in control. But the tiger, in
this case, is the silver market, including industrial consumers and
investors. As real silver supplies have grown tighter and inventories
more closely held, what was once something easy to control, has grown
large and hungry and dangerous to the big shorts. A shortage will expose
their weakness. That is inevitable. One slip and they will be eaten.
That’s because their maneuvers and tricks are becoming more visible to
growing numbers of investors. And tricks won’t work for long in a real
shortage. The tiger will demand sharply higher prices. |