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WEEKLY COMMENTARY
February 17, 2003
Also see new articles at:
Best of Mark Rostenko
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Barrick's Silver Bombshell
By Theodore Butler
(The following essay was written by silver analyst Theodore Butler.
Investment Rarities does not necessarily endorse these views, which may
or may not prove to be correct.)
On February 12, Barrick Gold issued two press releases. (Both can be
found at www.barrick.com) One announced the firing of its current CEO,
and his replacement, due to poor financial performance, especially its
stock performance. The other press release concerned its fourth quarter
earnings and details on the hedge book. While there has been ample
discussion and numerous articles on the gold hedge book, it appears that
a blockbuster announcement on silver in the press release has gone
unnoticed. And since Barrick is one of, if not the largest, silver short
in the world, their announcement that they intend to deliver against and
to buy back and cover their entire silver hedge book (not gold), could
have profound impact on the market.
About four or five years ago I wrote about Barrick Gold and the
influence their forward selling had upon the price of gold and silver. I
held them up as the example of manipulation of gold and silver through
leasing and short selling. I complained about them to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Barrick's
own auditors, and, of course, to Barrick itself. I think I was the first
one to raise the issue publicly. I say this not to boast, but only to
give full disclosure and perspective in what I have to say about Barrick
today.
My main gripe was about Barrick's role in hedging. Legitimate hedging
did not allow for years of future production to be dumped on the market
in physical form, as leasing and forward selling permitted. Further, I
complained that selling short years of production forward, regardless of
the price, was so stupid as to defy description. Most of my writing
about Barrick took place while gold traded under $300, and even under
$275. My point was that legitimate hedging doesn't take place at prices
approximating the cost of production. Shareholders are not well served
by the company eliminating the profit potential from rising gold prices.
Had Barrick taken this advice to cover their gold shorts at those price
levels, they would have come out as heroes, and their shareholders would
have benefited greatly. In addition, had Barrick covered their gold
shorts while prices were low, they would have been in position to hedge
at much higher prices (over $100 higher) and lock in real profits for
their shareholders. Instead, they actually increased their short
position and have suffered the consequences.
While they obviously made a serious mistake in not closing out their
gold shorts while prices were low, Barrick is not run by stupid people.
As one of the largest gold miners in the world, they get advice from
what are thought to be the best minds in the financial world. They
appear to be learning from their mistakes in gold, based upon the
unambiguous nature of what they say about their silver hedge intentions.
In the Notes to the Financial Statement section of their earnings
announcement, in a section entitled, "Spot deferred silver sales
contracts and written silver call options", Barrick stated the
following, on Feb. 12:
"Spot deferred silver sales contracts have the same delivery terms and
pricing mechanism as spot deferred gold sales contracts. A group of
these contracts totaling 14.3 million ounces of silver are accounted for
as normal sales contracts, as it is probable that we will physically
deliver silver production into the contracts. For a separate group of
contracts totaling 21 million ounces, we intend to financially settle
these contracts, and therefore they are accounted for as derivatives
under FAS 133."
In following Barrick closely for many years, I can tell you they have
never made such a statement before. In addition to delivering this
year's (maybe entire) silver production against the hedge book, Barrick
intends to "financially settle" the rest of the silver short hedge book.
That's big news. So big, that had they made the same announcement about
gold, it would be all anyone talked about. But they didn't say that
about gold, only silver. And I think there is a very good reason for
that, namely, that Barrick finally understands the real risk of a big
silver short position.
Barrick, in addition to being the largest gold, and probably largest
silver short in the world, is also the "soul" of physical forward short
selling. They were the pioneers and are the leaders and pacesetters of
gold and silver hedging. They wrote the book. Everyone else followed
their lead. For Barrick to come out and state their intention to cover
their silver shorts is both profound and intelligent. It is likely that
other silver shorts, including other mining company shorts, will also
see the light and follow Barrick. That could have a big impact on the
silver market. And it would be in the best interests of the other shorts
to follow the leader, precisely because Barrick's move makes good sense.
Barrick has good reason to have decided to get out of their silver
shorts, the same good reason for an investor to buy silver - the
risk/reward ratio. There is not much real room to the downside in silver
nor potential hedging profits or protection. Silver prices have gigantic
upside potential, $50 or $100 higher, or more. Dimes to the downside,
dollars to the upside is not very inviting to a short seller.
Barrick's directors and risk control people took a close look at their
overall liability, in light of their poor performance, and obviously
concluded that silver presented a problem. A 46 million ounce silver
short position ( there's almost 11 million additional ounces short via
written call options) offers scant protection for Barrick to the
downside, maybe $20 million on a decline in silver prices. But, at
$25/per ounce, Barrick would be out a billion dollars on their silver
hedge. At $50, they'd be out $2 billion, at $100, $4 billion. Smart
management does not make bets that offer so little in reward with risk
that might break the bank. Barrick has wised up. It's about time.
The reason Barrick has decided to close out their silver shorts also
might have to do with the cost of doing so. Because silver is so dirt
cheap, it would not take relatively large amounts of money. While
Barrick is being intentionally cryptic in saying they will "financially
settle" a large chunk of their silver short position, even if they paid
cash for all 35 million ounces held physically short, that comes to $175
million, something Barrick could afford.
With the leading silver short saying, in effect, that they will short no
more, the manipulation that has existed for decades is losing a key
sponsor. Who will take their place, with $4.50 silver and everything
saying buy, don't sell? There is the very real possibility of a domino
effect here. Putting aside the deficit and real supply/demand
fundamentals, if the other shorts wake up, as Barrick has, and go to
cover their shorts and short no more, that alone could drive silver to
$100/ounce.
Also, I can't help but recall the correspondence, over the past year,
with the CFTC and the COMEX, about me questioning the legitimacy of the
giant and concentrated silver short position. I said show the me the
real silver or legitimate hedging it represented. They couldn't show the
silver, because it doesn't exist. Now the largest silver short is
clearly saying they don't wish to be hedged anymore. I ask the CFTC and
COMEX, with Barrick renouncing silver hedging, who is legitimately
hedging silver?
I want to congratulate Barrick for coming to their senses by terminating
their silver hedges. All Barrick shareholders should be dancing with
glee. They will no longer be in harm's way because of a silver price
explosion. Many silver investors already know what Barrick now knows.
Soon, the whole world will know. |